We consider an experiment that conducts observations on an uncertain parameter. Experiments observing a parameter with a stochastic uncertainty have been studied exhaustively and their characteristics have been described by many authors [see, e.g., De Groot, M. (1974), Optimal Statistical Decisions (Russian translation)]. In this article, we assume that uncertainty is generated by a mechanism which is “random in the broad sense” [a term introduced by Kolmogorov, A.N. (1986), in Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics (in Russia), pp. 467–471]. Ivanenko, V.I. (...) and Labkovskii, V.A. [(1986), Dokladi Na Bolgarskata Akademiya Na Naukite SSSR 287(3), 564–567; (1990), Dokladi Na Bolgarskata Akademiya Na Naukite SSSR 310(5), 1059–1062] have proposed the apparatus of “statistical regularities” for the description of such randomness. Statistical regularity (SR) is a family of finitely additive probability distributions such that particular SRs correspond to total uncertainty, stochastic uncertainty, and other forms of uncertainty. The problem in which uncertainty is specified by SR is accordingly called General Decision Problem (GDP). We investigate informativeness and optimality of experiments in GDP. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Neo-Idealist Reception of Kant in the Moscow Psychological SocietyRandall A. Poole*The Moscow Psychological Society, founded in 1885 at Moscow University, was the philosophical center of the revolt against positivism in the Russian Silver Age. By the end of its activity in 1922 it had played the major role in the growth of professional philosophy in Russia. 1 The Society owes its name to its founder, M. M. Troitsky (...) (1835–99), an empiricist psychologist. Although it sponsored significant psychological research, its greater importance in the history of Russian philosophy began to emerge already in 1888, when Nikolai Ia. Grot (1852–99) took over as director. Grot’s principal colleagues in the affairs of the Society included the major Russian idealist philosophers Vladimir S. Solov’ev (1853–1900), Sergei N. Trubetskoi (1862–1905), and Lev M. Lopatin (1855–1920). In 1889 the Psychological Society began publication of Russia’s first regular, specialized journal in philosophy, Questions of Philosophy and Psychology (Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii). Grot characterized the journal’s prevailing direction as idealist or, “in respect to method, metaphysical.” 2While the cultural revival of the Silver Age mounted a broad-based revolt against positivism, neo-idealist philosophy in the Psychological Society was distinctive in the theoretical depth of its critique. Positivism was remarkably pervasive [End Page 319] in Russia from the middle of the nineteenth century. The main characteristics of this positivist Weltanschauung were reductionism, which dismissed as a meaningless proposition (neither analytic nor empirical) the possibility of being beyond the positively-given data of sense experience, i.e., phenomena in space and time; scientism, the claim, consistent with the positivist reduction of being to natural phenomena, that the methodology of the natural sciences covered eve-rything; and utopianism, the hope that the application of natural scientific methods to man and society would make human existence as regular and well-ordered as nature. 3 The defining trait was reductionism or, in other words, naturalism or atheism: the reduction of being to nature. In ethics, epistemology, ontology, and social philosophy neo-idealism emerged as a response to these characteristics. Its development by philosophers in the Psychological Society, apart from comprising a basic chapter in the history of Russian thought, informs the European-wide revolt against positivism characteristic of fin-de-siècle culture.According to scientistic positivism, philosophy had no distinctive methodology and thus no legitimate right to exist as its own type of scientific (nauchnyi or wissenschaftlich) discipline. Empirical sciences were the only sciences; philosophy could at best serve as a field that systematized empirical research. Against these claims Russian neo-idealists sought to advance the autonomy of philosophy by showing that the positivist measure of reality was far from exhaustive and that what it did not exhaust comprised the domain of philosophy. This domain was human consciousness itself, to the extent it could be shown to be irreducible to empirical experience (the positivist sphere). Neo-idealism thus took shape as a type of philosophy of consciousness. In the inaugural issue of Questions of Philosophy and Psychology S. N. Trubetskoi published the first installment of a large essay bearing the title, “On the Nature of Human Consciousness.” “The question of the nature of consciousness is the principal question of philosophy, not only of psychology,” Trubetskoi wrote, “for in consciousness we know everything that we know.” 4 Trubetskoi and his colleagues in the Psychological Society were convinced that philosophy had to develop through specification of its own internal standards and through autonomization from the spurious criteria positivism applied externally to it. Their goal was to match, in theoretical rigor, the professionalism associated with the natural sciences by making philosophy “scientific,” but on idealist, not empirical grounds. [End Page 320]The Kantian Critique of PositivismIn their defense of the self against positivist reductionism and naturalism, neo-idealists of the Psychological Society were deeply indebted to Kant, in both epistemology and moral philosophy. This claim revises the traditional view that Russian philosophy developed without significant assistance from Kant. 5In two ways Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason defends the minimal idealist claim that not everything intellectual can be reduced to the natural (sensible or psychological), that consciousness cannot... (shrink)

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic (...) incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud. (shrink)

Banks have an important social responsibility to serve the real economy and to maintain financial stability, and they also need to be responsible to borrowers and others. Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic affecting the global economy and increasing financial risks, it is particularly important for banks to assume social responsibilities. This study theoretically analyzed the outstanding applicability of stakeholder governance theory. Using a two-stage game method, the optimal pressure intensity of the social responsibility stakeholders was calculated, and the (...) dynamic performance of shareholders was deduced. We found that the establishment of the social responsibility stakeholder governance mechanism will prompt the bank to fulfill its social responsibilities; rational social responsibility stakeholders will not lead to poor bank management due to excessive behavior; and shareholders with social responsibility can self-consciously choose the investment projects with lower negative externalities. The conclusions can be summarized as follows: The participation of stakeholder and the establishment of the social responsibility function of the board of directors can help promote a bank's social responsibility performance. This work studied the social responsibility of banks from the new perspective of stakeholder governance, expands the theoretical boundaries, and puts forward relevant suggestions to enhance the application value of this research. (shrink)